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Abstract 
 
This paper tests the impact of risk and competition on efficiency in the Chinese banking 
industry over the period 2003-2013. Comprehensive types of risk-taking behaviour are 
considered including credit risk, liquidity risk, capital risk, and insolvency risk. Competition is 
measured by the Lerner index. The results are cross-checked using an alternative econometric 
technique as well as an alternative competition indicator. The findings show that the technical 
and pure technical efficiencies of Chinese commercial banks are significantly and negatively 
affected by liquidity risk. They further show that greater competition precedes declines in 
technical and pure technical efficiencies of Chinese commercial banks. The results suggest that 
Chinese bank efficiency is significantly affected by bank diversification, banking sector 
development, stock market development, inflation and GDP growth rate. The findings also 
indicate that, compared to state-owned commercial banks, joint-stock commercial banks and 
city commercial banks have lower technical and pure technical efficiencies. 
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1 Introduction 
The banking sector in China plays an important role in the development of the country’s 
economy. According to statistics from the World Bank, at the end of 2012, the domestic credit 
provided by the banking sector in China accounted for 155.1% of GDP 1 . Therefore, the 
performance of Chinese banks has attracted great attention from the government, banking 
regulatory authorities and academic researchers. Technical efficiency, as one important 
indicator of bank performance, measures the extent to which banks have the ability to minimize 
the amount of inputs used in producing a certain amount of outputs or use certain amounts of 
inputs to maximize output production. Two components of technical efficiency, namely pure 
technical efficiency and scale efficiency, provide more information with regard to the source of 
efficiency. More specifically, pure technical efficiency relates to the ability of bank managers to 
utilize banks’ given resources. Higher ability is reflected by higher pure technical efficiency, 
while scale efficiency refers to exploiting scale economies by operating at a point where the 
production frontier exhibits constant returns to scale. Lower scale efficiency indicates that 
banks have more room to adjust their scale of operation, while the resulting increase in scale 
efficiency contributes to the overall improvement of technical efficiency.  
Several rounds of banking reforms in China have increased competition in the Chinese banking 
sector. The traditional Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP)2 theory uses the concentration 
ratio as the measure of bank competition. According to the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (CBRC), the share of the five state-owned commercial banks’ (SOCBs) assets in 
total banking sector assets in China decreased to 43.3% between 2003 and 2013. However, 
joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs) and city commercial banks (CCBs) have kept increasing 
in size and by 2013, they held 17.8% and 10.03% of total banking sector assets respectively. 
This shows that competitive conditions in the Chinese banking sector have increased. Table 1 
summarizes the assets of SOCBs, JSCBs, CCBs and total banking institutions in China over the 
period 2003-2013. 
<<Table 1---about here>> 
Competition has a significant impact on efficiency in the banking industry according to the 
competition-efficiency and competition-inefficiency hypotheses. These hypotheses have been 
widely tested in the European and US banking sectors (Brissimis et al., 2008; Casu and 
Girardone, 2009 and Ariss, 2010); however, they have not been tested in the Chinese banking 
industry. Testing these hypotheses in the Chinese banking industry will produce policy 
implications for the Chinese government, as well as the banking regulatory authorities, 
concerning the enhancement of the performance of Chinese commercial banks.  
Not only have the competitive conditions in the Chinese banking industry been improved, but 
the stability of the industry has been enhanced. According to the statistics released from the 
CBRC, the non-performing loan ratios (NPLs) over the period 2011-2013 were kept at 1% 
                                                           
1
 The data is from http://data.worldbank.org. 
2 The Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) theory argues that in a highly concentrated 
banking market where competition is low, the banks tend to collude with each other to obtain 
supernormal profits. 
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which were lower than the figures for 2008-2010; thus, the credit risk undertaken by the 
Chinese banking industry has fallen. Furthermore, capital risk undertaken by Chinese 
commercial banks has also been reduced. CBRC statistics show that over the period 2010-2013, 
the average capital adequacy ratio of Chinese commercial banks was over 12%, which was 
higher than the requirement of Basel III (11.5%). The condition of liquidity risk has been 
improved and, as reported by the CBRC, the liquidity ratio of Chinese commercial banks was 
44% by the end of 2013. Although the ratio was lower than the figure for 2012, which was 
45.8%, it was higher than the ones for 2010 and 2011, which were 42.2% and 43.3% 
respectively.  
There are studies examining the impact of risk on bank efficiency (see Williams, 2004; 
Altunbas et al., 2007; Fiordelisi et al., 2011). However, most of them focus on the European 
banking sector; there are very few studies investigating the impact of risk on efficiency in the 
Chinese banking sector (see Ariff and Can, 2008; Tan and Floros, 2013; Zhang et al., 2013). In 
addition, all the above mentioned studies focus on credit risk and insolvency risk in the banking 
sector, while a consideration of different types of risk-taking behaviour in the Chinese banking 
industry provides not only policy implications for the Chinese government and banking 
regulatory authorities to reduce risk-taking behaviour but a way to improve bank performance.  
This paper adds to the existing literature and extends the previous studies in the following three 
ways: 1) it investigates comprehensive types of risk in the Chinese banking sector including 
credit risk, capital risk, liquidity risk, as well as insolvency risk; 2) the insolvency risk is 
measured by stability inefficiency rather than Z-score, in order to provide more robustness 
results; and 3) using the Lerner index rather than the concentration ratio as the competition 
indicator, it builds on the work of Zhang et al. (2013) to provide more accurate results with 
regard to the impact of competition on efficiency; 4) the impacts of risk and competition on 
efficiency in the Chinese banking sector are cross checked by different econometric estimation 
techniques including bootstrap truncated regression and fractional logit regression; 5) the 
robustness of the results are also cross-checked by using an efficiency-adjusted Lerner index as 
an alternative competition indicator.  
The results show that the technical and pure technical efficiencies of Chinese commercial banks 
are significantly and negatively affected by liquidity risk. Furthermore, the findings show that 
greater competition precedes declines in the technical and pure technical efficiencies of Chinese 
banks. The findings further report that the efficiency of Chinese commercial banks is 
significantly affected by bank diversification, banking sector development, stock market 
development, inflation and GDP growth rate. Finally, compared to the SOCBs, JSCBs and 
CCBs are found to have lower technical and pure technical efficiencies.  
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 briefly reviews the structure of and reforms within 
the Chinese banking industry, which is followed in section 3 by a review of the literature on the 
impact of risk on bank efficiency, the competition-efficiency and competition-inefficiency 
hypotheses, as well as the empirical investigation of efficiency in the Chinese banking sector. 
Section 4 describes the main methodologies used to estimate the impacts of risk and 
competition on bank efficiency. Section 5 presents the data used and discusses the empirical 
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results. Section 6 presents a robustness check and finally section 7 provides a summary and 
conclusion. 
2 The Chinese banking industry 
The Chinese banking system followed a mono-bank model before 1978. The central bank - the 
Peoples’ Bank of China (PBC) - took the function of a central bank, as well as engaging in 
commercial bank operations. A series of economic reforms was initiated by the Chinese 
government in 1979 to transform the planned economy to a market-based economy. The 
banking sector in China was also rebuilt and redesigned. A two-tier banking system was created 
during the period 1979-1993, with the PBC to serve as the Central Bank and four SOCBs3 to 
engage in commercial bank lending. A number of JSCBs 4  and rural and urban credit 
cooperatives were also established during this period. The SOCBs made loans to state-owned 
enterprises under government direction with no consideration of credit checks and risk 
monitoring which led to the accumulation of non-performing loans. During this period, 
competition among Chinese banks was limited.  
In order to alleviate the problem of large volumes of non-performing loans in SOCBs, three 
policy banks were established by the Chinese government in 1994. Their main functions were: 
1) to take over the responsibilities undertaken by SOCBs previously and 2) to make loans in 
line with government policies. Thus, SOCBs were transformed gradually into true commercial 
banks and they had increasing freedom in terms of credit and lending decisions.  
In order to reduce the volumes of non-performing loans in SOCBs, four asset management 
companies (AMCs) (Cinda AMC, Huarong AMC, Great Wall AMC and Oriental AMC) were 
established by the government in 1999, with each oriented to a specific state-owned bank. The 
AMCs purchased and managed non-performing loans and they were under the supervision of 
the PBC. There have been three non-performing loan write-offs by AMCs - in 1999, 2004 and 
2005. In 1999, the four AMCs purchased RMB 1.4 trillion non-performing loans from the four 
SOCBs and China Development Bank. In 2004, non-performing loans worth RMB 278.7 billion 
were purchased by Cinda AMC from the Bank of China and the China Construction Bank. In 
2005, non-performing loans worth RMB 142.4 billion were purchased by Oriental and Cinda 
AMC from the Bank of China, RMB 56.9 billion from the China Construction Bank and RMB 
64 billion from the Bank of Communication. These purchases reduced the volumes of non-
performing loans of Chinese SOCBs and increased their competitiveness in the world. 
The Chinese government and banking regulatory authorities deal not only with the issue of non-
performing loans, but take measures to increase competition in the banking sector, such as 
easing the licensing and entry requirements for new small and medium-sized domestic banks. A 
number of new JSCBs were established in 1996, 2004 and 20055. Furthermore, in order for the 
                                                           
3They were the Bank of China (BOC), Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), China Construction 
Bank (CCB) and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). 
4 These banks include Citic Bank, China Merchant Bank, Shenzhen Development Bank, China 
Everbright Bank, Industrial Bank, Guangdong Development Bank, HuaXia Bank, Shanghai 
Pudong Development Bank and Evergrowing Bank. 
5They are: China Minsheng Bank, China Zheshang Bank and China Bohai Bank.  
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banks to obtain external funds and additional monitoring and in an attempt to increase 
competition between them, they were encouraged to list on the stock exchange. By the end of 
2013, all the SOCBs had completed successfully their initial public offerings (IPOs), with ICBC 
having raised US$21.9 billion on the Shanghai and Hong Kong stock exchanges in 2006, 
becoming the largest IPO at that time. The successful listing of the Agricultural Bank of China 
on the Shanghai and Hong Kong Stock Exchanges in 2010 broke the record made by the ICBC, 
and raised funds worth USD 22.1 billion, becoming the largest IPO at that time, while eight of 
the 12 JSCBs were listed on a variety of stock exchanges6. 
The CBRC, which is the primary government agency and point of control for commercial banks, 
was established by the State Council 7  in 2003. The CBRC is responsible not only for 
supervising commercial banking operations, but also for formulating rules and regulations, 
authorizing the establishment, changes, termination and business scope of banking institutions 
and conducting on-site examination and off-site surveillance of their operations. The objective 
is to protect the interest of depositors and maintain market confidence through prudent and 
effective supervision.  
At the end of 2013, the Chinese banking sector consisted of three policy banks, five large-scale 
(state-owned) commercial banks8, 12 JSCBs, 145 CCBs and a large number of other financial 
institutions, such as credit cooperatives, foreign banks, trust companies and the finance 
companies of enterprise groups.  
3 Literature review 
The main aim of this paper is to test the impacts of risk-taking behaviour and competition on 
technical efficiency in the Chinese banking industry. This section firstly reviews relevant 
literature on the impact of risk-taking behaviour on bank efficiency, and then the literature on 
the impact of competition on banking efficiency. Finally, it reviews the empirical literature 
investigating efficiency in the Chinese banking sector.  
3.1 The impact of risk on bank efficiency 
Risk is regarded as an endogenous variable by a number of studies which have investigated its 
effect on bank efficiency (see Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Zhang et al., 2013; Altunbas et al., 
2007; Fiordelisi et al., 2011). These studies have mixed findings with regard to the impact of 
risk on bank efficiency. However, a number of studies treat risk as an exogenous variable (see 
Altunbas et al., 2000; Hughes et al., 2001; Chang and Chiu, 2006; Chiu et al., 2011). The results 
show that efficiency estimates are affected by taking into consideration the risk factor. 
                                                           
6 They are: China Merchant Bank, China Citic Bank, Hua Xia Bank, China Everbright Bank, Shanghai 
Pudong Development Bank, China Minsheng Bank, Industrial Bank and Ping An bank (Shenzhen 
Development bank). 
7 The State Council is the chief administrative authority of the People’s Republic of China.  
8 They are: Bank of China (BOC), China Construction Bank (CCB), Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China (ICBC), Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) and Bank of Communication (BOCOM). 
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Berger and Humphrey (1997) argue that, whether or not risk should be included in the 
estimation of bank efficiency depends on whether “bad luck” 9  or “bad management” 10 
dominates. In particular, if poor performance results from bad luck, risk should be treated as an 
exogenous variable in the efficiency estimation. On the other hand, if the poor performance 
results from bad management, the risk should be treated as an endogenous variable.  
Berger and DeYoung (1997) argue that the hypotheses can be tested if non-performing loans 
are excluded from the estimation of bank efficiency. Furthermore, the impact of risk on the 
efficiency of the Chinese banking sector in the current study is examined in the second stage 
analysis; thus, the efficiency estimates in the first stage should not take into consideration the 
risk factor.  
3.2 Competition-inefficiency and competition-efficiency hypotheses  
Competition-inefficiency hypothesis 
The competition-inefficiency hypothesis suggests that competition leads to a decline in bank 
efficiency for the following reasons. First, as argued by Boot and Schmeits (2005), the 
relationships between customers and banks are less stable and shorter in a highly competitive 
environment. Furthermore, greater bank competition increases customers’ propensity to switch 
to other service providers. The information asymmetries are amplified by this phenomenon and 
additional resources for screening and monitoring borrowers are required. Second, Chan et al. 
(1986) argue that a shorter duration of bank relationships can be expected in a competitive 
environment; the reduction of relationship-building activities inhibits the reusability and value 
of information. The negative impact of competition on efficiency is supported by the empirical 
studies of Evanoff and Ors (2002), DeYoung et al. (1998) and Kumbhakar et al. (2001). 
Competition-efficiency hypothesis 
The competition-efficiency hypothesis is derived from the “efficient structure hypothesis” and 
suggests that there is a positive impact of competition on efficiency. This effect can be 
explained by Zarutskie (2013) who argues that greater competition induces banks to specialize 
and focus on certain types of loans or particular groups of borrowers. This induces bank 
managers to adjust their lending technologies. The costs of processing and originating loans can 
be lowered and the borrowers can be better monitored. This positive impact can also be 
explained by the “Quiet Life hypothesis” which argues that managers with monopoly power 
enjoy a share of monopoly rents, they are careless in their expense management and working 
effort is reduced which leads to a decline in efficiency. The existence of a positive impact of 
competition on efficiency is also supported by Chen (2007) and Dick and Lehnert (2010). 
3.3 Investigation of efficiency in the Chinese banking sector 
                                                           
9 According to the bad luck hypothesis, the increases in problem loans result from exogenous events; it 
does not have a strong relationship with managers’ skills and their risk-taking appetite (Berger and 
DeYoung, 1997). 
10 According to the bad management hypothesis, banks with lower levels of efficiency are not well 
managed, while the bank manager has lower ability to control and monitor expenses; this leads to higher 
costs and a larger volume of non-performing loans (Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Williams, 2004). 
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There are a number of empirical studies published on the efficiency of the Chinese banking 
sector (Ariff and Can, 2008; Berger et al., 2009; Sufian and Habibullah, 2011; Sufian and Majid, 
2009; Kumbhakar and Wang, 2007; Zhang et al., 2012; Du and Girma, 2011; Huang and Fu, 
2013; Tan and Floros, 2013; Wang et al., 2014). The findings from most of these studies show 
that JSCBs have higher efficiency than SOCBs, while the efficiency of Chinese commercial 
banks can be improved by increasing foreign participation.  
Few studies have investigated the impact of risk on efficiency in the Chinese banking industry. 
Using a non-parametric approach, Ariff and Can (2008) investigate the cost and profit 
efficiencies of 28 Chinese commercial banks over the period 1995-2004. The findings suggest 
that improving risk management is helpful in increasing the efficiency of Chinese banks11. 
Berger et al. (2009) use a stochastic frontier approach to investigate the cost and profit 
efficiencies of 38 Chinese commercial banks with different ownership types over the period 
1994-2003. The findings suggest that large volumes of non-performing loans precede declines 
in efficiency in SOCBs12. Tan and Floros (2013) use a three-stage least square estimator to 
investigate the inter-relationships between bank efficiency, risk and capitalization over the 
period 2003-2009. The empirical results suggest that there is a positive and significant 
relationship between risk and efficiency13. Using a sample of commercial banks from China, 
India, Russia and Brazil, Zhang et al. (2013) test the impact of risk on bank efficiency. The 
results indicate that banks with lower levels of risk have higher efficiency14. 
There is only one study testing the impact of competition on bank efficiency in China. Zhang et 
al. (2012) use an output-oriented stochastic distance function approach to evaluate the total 
factor productivity of 150 Chinese commercial banks over the period 1999-2008. They also 
investigate the effect of competition on bank profit efficiency. The empirical results suggest 
that efficiency in the Chinese banking industry is significantly affected by competition in the 
financial services industry15.  
In summary, there are extensive pieces of research investigating efficiency in the Chinese 
banking sector; however, few studies also examine the impact of risk on efficiency in the 
Chinese banking sector. This paper contributes to the empirical literature by comprehensively 
investigating risk conditions in the Chinese banking sector. In addition, insolvency risk, which 
was measured by Z-score in previous studies (Iannotta et al., 2007; Liu and Wilson 2013, Liu et 
al., 2013), is measured by stability inefficiency in the current paper, which will provide more 
accurate results (see section 4.2 for detail). Furthermore, by using the Lerner index rather than 
the concentration ratio and the index of competition in financial markets (Zhang et al., 2013; 
Zhang et al., 2012) as the competition indicator, this study provides more accurate results with 
regard to the impact of competition on efficiency in the Chinese banking industry. Finally, this 
                                                           
11 This study focuses on credit risk, liquidity risk and capital risk.  
12 This study focuses on credit risk only. 
13 This study focuses on credit risk and insolvency risk.  
14 Quite a few risks have been investigated including credit risk, liquidity risk, capital risk, market risk as 
well as overall risk. 
15 An index of competition in financial markets is provided in the study which is very rarely used in the 
empirical literature.   
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study uses bootstrapped truncated regression to test the impacts of risk and competition on bank 
efficiency in China. This is then cross checked by fractional logit regression.  
4 Methodology 
Due to the fact that the main aim of this paper is to test the impacts of risk-taking behaviour and 
competition on technical efficiency in the Chinese banking industry, this section is structured as 
follows: first, the method used to estimate the technical efficiency, pure technical efficiency and 
scale efficiency is presented, which is followed by the presentation of the method used to 
measure bank risk. This study investigates different types of risk-taking behaviour in the 
Chinese banking industry; namely credit risk, liquidity risk, capital risk, as well as insolvency 
risk. The former four types of risk mentioned are measured by relevant accounting ratios. Credit 
risk is measured by the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, where the higher figure of 
this ratio indicates higher credit risk (see Fiordelisi et al., 2011; Beck et al., 2013; Pan and 
Wang, 2013; Craig and Dinger, 2013; Liang et al., 2013; Abedifar et al., 2013; Farruggio and 
Uhde, 2015). Liquidity risk is measured by the ratio of liquid assets to total assets, where the 
higher figure of this ratio shows that the bank has lower liquidity risk (see Altunbas et al., 2000; 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga., 2004; Altunbas et al., 2007; Brissimis et al., 2008; Goddard et 
al., 2009; Radic et al., 2012). Capital risk is measured by the total regulatory capital ratio, 
where a higher total regulatory capital ratio indicates that the bank has lower capital risk (see 
Kleff and Weber, 2008; Francis and Osborne, 2012; Distinguin et al., 2013; Molyneux et al., 
2014; Onali, 2014). The last type of risk-taking behaviour investigated is insolvency risk; rather 
than using an accounting ratio, namely the Z-score, we use a translog specification to estimate 
stability inefficiency since it is more robust (see Fang et al., 2011; Tabak et al., 2012). This 
estimation is illustrated in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 discusses the method used to measure 
competition in the Chinese banking industry. Further, Section 4.4 explains the method used to 
test the impacts of risk and competition on technical efficiency, while Section 4.5 discusses the 
possible impacts of the relevant controlled variables on the technical efficiency of Chinese 
commercial banks.  
4.1 Estimation of technical efficiency in the Chinese banking sector 
The efficiency estimates in this study are obtained using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). 
DEA, which is a linear programming technique originated by CCR (Charnes, Cooper and 
Rhodes, 1978). The CCR model measures the efficiency of each Decision Making Unit (DMU) 
which is obtained as a maximum of a ratio of weighted outputs to weighted inputs. This denotes 
that the less are the inputs invested in producing given outputs, the more efficient is the 
production. The CCR model presupposes that there is no significant relationship between the 
scale of operation and efficiency by assuming constant returns to scale (CRS). The CRS 
assumption is only suitable when all DMUs are operating at an optimum scale.  
Banker et al. (1984) extend the CCR model by relaxing the CRS assumption. The resulting 
“BCC” model was used to assess the efficiency of DMUs characterized by variable returns to 
scale (VRS). The VRS assumption provides the measurement of pure technical efficiency 
(PTE), which is the measurement of technical efficiency devoid of the scale efficiency effect. In 
other words, the difference between technical efficiency and pure technical efficiency lies in the 
Page 9 of 36
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 
fact that the latter measures purely the inefficiency derived from managerial underperformance. 
The CCR model can be expressed as follows: 
0,0,0,min , ≥≥−≥+− λλθλθλθ XXYysubjectto ii                                                        (1)                                                                                                                            
Where θ  is a scalar and λ  is a N×1 vector of constants, Y represents all input and output data 
for N firms, iX are individual inputs and iy  the outputs for the i th firm. The efficiency score 
for each DMU is given by θ ; it takes a value between 0 and 1, which indicates the efficiency 
level. 
The CRS linear programming problem can be easily modified to account for VRS by adding the 
convexity constraint, 11' =λN , to provide: 
0,11,0,0,min ', ≥=≥−≥+− λλλθλθλθ NXXYysubjectto ii     
                                                                                                                                (2)                                                                                                                    
Where N1 is an N×1 vector of ones. This approach forms a convex hull of intersecting plans 
which envelop the data points more tightly than the CRS conical hull; this provides pure 
technical efficiency scores which are greater than or equal to those obtained using the CRS 
model. If the efficiency scores obtained from the CRS model and the VRS model are different, 
this indicates that the DMU has scale inefficiency, and that the scale inefficiency can be 
calculated from the difference between the VRS technical efficiency (TE) score and the CRS 
TE score. The relationship between CRS and VRS is given below: 
SETETE VRSCRS *=                                                                                                              (3)                                                                                 
The main argument for using the DEA rather than parametric techniques, such as SFA, lies in 
the fact that it works particularly well with small samples. Furthermore, it is able to handle 
multiple inputs and outputs stated in different measurement units and it does not necessitate 
knowledge of any functional form of the frontier (see Charnes et al., 1995). Most empirical 
papers show that using DEA to estimate the efficient frontier can yield robust results (see 
Seiford and Thrall, 1990). Therefore, this study uses the DEA CCR and BCC models to 
measure the technical, pure technical and scale efficiencies of Chinese banks (Tan and Floros, 
2013; Chortareas et al., 2012; Chorareas et al., 2013). 
The intermediation approach for the selection of inputs and outputs is taken rather than the 
production approach, with the latter suited to branch evaluation. Banks are viewed as financial 
intermediaries which accumulate deposits and purchase funds and then intermediate these funds 
(Sealey and Lindley, 1977). In selecting the input and output variables, this study follows the 
suggestions made by Berger and Humphrey (1997); they argue that deposits have a dual role 
and should be regarded as both an input (which is used to fund loans) and an output (through 
which it provides services to depositors). The inputs and outputs used in this study and their 
statistics are shown in Table 2. To be more specific, this study uses two inputs price of deposit 
(measured by the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits) and the price of capital (measured 
by the ratio of non-interest expenses to fixed assets). Two input prices are considered due to the 
fact that non-interest expenses include the labour cost as well (Hasan and Morton, 2003). In 
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other words, the price of capital considers the factors relating to the price of physical capital as 
well as the price of human capital. There are four outputs selected in the current study, which 
are total loans, securities, non-interest income and total deposit. This selection follows the study 
of Fu and Heffernan (2007) 
4.2 Estimation of stability in the Chinese banking sector-stability inefficiency 
Fang et al. (2011) argue that the potential stability of banks cannot necessarily be reflected by 
the Z-score16. The deviation from the banks’ current stability and the maximum stability must 
be considered. This study provides a measure of a bank’s stability inefficiency by estimating a 
stochastic frontier (Aigner et al., 1977; Meeusen and Van den Broeck, 1977) with the Z-score 
as the dependent variable of a translog specification. The equation used to estimate the frontier 
can be expressed as follows: 
∑∑ ∑∑ ++++++=
−
j
ititjitjitit
j j k
itkitjitjkjitjit
W
W
LNLNY
W
W
LN
W
W
LN
W
W
LNLNYLNYLNY
W
scoreZ
LN εθββδδδ )()()(
2
1
)(
2
1
)(
2
1
2
1
2
1
11
2
1
10
2
 (4) 
W represents the input price; this study considers two input prices which are the price of funds 
(the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits) and the price of capital (the ratio of non-interest 
expenses to total assets). Y represents four outputs which are total loans, total deposits, 
securities and non-interest income. The sub-indices i and t represent bank i operates at time t, 
while j and k represent different outputs. The error term itε equals itit υν − . The first term  
itν captures the random disturbance which is assumed to be normally distributed and represents 
the measurement errors and other uncontrolled factors, i.e. itν ~N(0, 
2
vσ ). The second term  
itυ captures the technical and allocative inefficiency, both under managerial control, and it is 
assumed to be half-normally distributed, i. e. itυ ~
+N ( ,itµ
2
vσ ). Higher stability inefficiency 
indicates higher risk, while lower stability inefficiency means the risk is lower.  
4.3 Estimation of competition in the Chinese banking sector-Lerner index 
Previous studies have used a variety of methods to investigate the competitive conditions in the 
banking industry (see Al-Muharrami et al., 2006; Matthews et al., 2007; Jeon et al., 2011; 
                                                           
16 The Z-score reflects the extent to which banks have the ability to absorb losses. Thus, a higher value 
of Z-score indicates lower risk and greater stability. The Z-score has been widely by empirical studies 
used to measure the stability of financial institutions (see Hesse and Cihak, 2007; Iannotta et al. 2007; 
Beck et al. 2009; Liu and Wilson 2013; Liu et al., 2013; Fiordelisi and Mare, 2014). The Z-score can be 
expressed as follows: 
   )(
/
ROA
AEROA
Z
σ
+
=
                                                                                                                        (5)
 
where ROA is banks’ Return on Assets, E/A is the ratio of equity to total assets, and )(ROAσ  is the 
standard deviation of Return on Assets.  
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Olivero et al., 2011; Tabak et al., 2012; Cipollini and Fiordelisi, 2012; Fungacova et al., 2014; 
Fu et al., 2014). The measurement of competition in the above mentioned studies mainly 
includes Panzar-Rosse H statistics, the Boone indicator and the Lerner index.  
Although there are a number of studies which have used the Panzar-Rosse H statistic to 
investigate competition in the banking sector, it suffers from two main drawbacks. First, the H 
statistic was developed on the basis of a static model and there are no predictions of the H-
statistic (Leuvensteijn et al., 2011). In other words, the estimate is surrounded by a degree of 
uncertainty. Secondly, the overall market equilibrium required by the test cannot be fulfilled 
because of market entry and exit, which leads to further limits on the interpretation of such an 
analysis (Claessens and Laeven, 2004).  
The Boone indicator also suffers from two disadvantages. First, it makes the assumption that 
part of the efficiency gains achieved by banks is passed onto consumers. In addition, this 
indicator also suffers from idiosyncratic variation, i.e. uncertainty (see Tabak et al., 2012). 
The Lerner index is used in this study mainly because: 1) it can be estimated by each bank in 
each year; 2) it can estimate the competitive conditions (market power) for three different 
ownership types of Chinese banks; 3) it does not suffer from the limitations of other 
competition indicators such as the Panzar-Rosse H statistic and the Boone indicator (see 
Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Leuvensteijn et al., 2011; Tabak et al., 2012). 
The Lerner index is defined as the difference between a bank's price and the marginal cost, 
divided by the price. The index value ranges from a maximum of 1 to a minimum of zero, with 
higher numbers indicating greater market power and hence lower competition. The Lerner 
index represents the extent to which a particular bank has market power to set its price above 
the marginal cost. 
The price is computed by estimating the average price of bank production as the ratio of total 
revenue to total assets (Fernandez de Guevara et al., 2005; Carbo et al., 2009a, b). The marginal 
cost is estimated on the basis of a translog cost function as follows: 
∑∑ ∑∑ ++++++=
j
ititjitjitit
j j k
itkitjitjkjitjit
W
W
LNLNY
W
W
LN
W
W
LN
W
W
LNLNYLNYLNY
W
C
LN εθββδδδ )()()(
2
1
)(
2
1
)(
2
1
2
1
2
1
11
2
1
10
2
(6) 
where C represents total cost of the bank, Y represents four outputs including total deposits, 
total loans, non-interest income and securities, W stands for two input prices with W1 
representing the price of funds which is measured by the ratio of interest expenses to total 
deposits, W2 represents the price of capital, which is measured by the ratio of non-interest 
expenses to fixed assets The linear homogeneity is ensured by normalizing the dependent 
variable and W1 by anther input price W2.   
The marginal cost of loans can be obtained by taking the first derivative of the dependent 
variable in the above equation in relationship to the output loans as follows: 
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The summary statistics of the variables used to estimate efficiency and Lerner index are 
provided in Table 2 
<<Table 2---about here>> 
4.4 Estimation of the impacts of risk and competition on technical efficiency-bootstrap 
truncated regression 
This study follows the estimation method proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007) who 
investigate the determinants of bank efficiency using the bootstrap technique. Before 
illustrating the estimation procedure, the following model is given: 
iii Z εβδ +=
ˆ                                                                                                                              (8) 
Where iZ  is a vector of explanatory variables which are supposed to have impacts on bank 
efficiency and β  refers to a vector of parameters with some statistical noise iε . Simar and 
Wilson (2007) argue that the advantage of bootstrapped truncated regression lies in the fact that 
it produces, with bias corrected estimates of δ , valid estimates for the parameters in the 
regression model.
 
The bootstrap algorithm is described in the following steps: 
1) Calculate the DEA technical efficiency score δˆ for each bank in each year: 
0,0,0,minˆ , ≥≥−≥+−= λλθλθλθ XXYYsubjecttoimizeET ii  
2) Use the maximum likelihood method to estimate the truncated regression of ET ˆ  on iZ  to 
provide an estimate βˆ  of  β  and an estimate εσˆ of εσ  
3) For each bank i=1……,I, repeat the next four steps (1-4) L times to yield a set of bootstrap 
estimates as { }L
bb
A
1
** )ˆ,ˆ(
=
= εσβ  
a. Draw iε  from the N(0, 
2ˆ
εσ )distribution with left truncation at ( iZβˆ1− ). 
b. Compute iii ZTE εβ +=
ˆ*  
c. The maximum likelihood method is used to estimate the truncated regression of *iTE  on iZ , 
yielding estimates ( ** ˆ,ˆ εσβ ).  
4) Use the bootstrap results to construct confidence intervals. 
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4.5 Determinants of the technical efficiency of Chinese banks 
In addition to investigating the impacts of risk and competition on technical efficiency, this 
study also controls for various bank-specific, industry-specific and macroeconomic variables 
which are supposed to have impacts on technical efficiency. The bank-specific determinants 
include bank size, bank diversification, and bank profitability. In addition, banking sector 
development and stock market development are included as industry-specific variables, while 
inflation and GDP growth rate are the macroeconomic determinants of technical efficiency. 
Bank size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. This measure is used widely in 
the empirical literature (see Goddard et al., 2004; Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Dietrich and 
Wanzenried, 2011). Banks with larger size are able to reduce costs from economies of scale and 
scope. The cost reduction precedes an improvement in efficiency; hence, it is expected that size 
is significantly and positively related to the technical efficiency of Chinese banks. Bank 
diversification is measured by the ratio of non-interest income to gross revenue (see Tan and 
Floros, 2012a; 2012b; 2012c). An increase in the variety of business engaged in by banks can 
decrease the operational cost from the economies of scope; the resultant reduction in cost 
precedes an increase in bank efficiency; thus, it is expected that this variable has a significant 
and positive sign. This study investigates comprehensive types of risk in the Chinese banking 
industry, including the following: credit risk, liquidity risk, capital risk, and insolvency risk. 
According to the bad luck hypothesis, increases in risk result in additional costs and managerial 
effort which further precede declines in bank efficiency (Berger and DeYoung, 1997). So, it is 
expected that risk has a significant and negative impact on bank efficiency. Profitability is 
measured by the traditional accounting indicator- Return on Assets (ROA); ROA is chosen as 
the profitability indicator due to the fact that it has emerged as the key ratio for the evaluation 
of bank profitability (Golin, 2001; Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Garcia-Herrero et al., 2009; Lee 
and Hsieh, 2013). It is expected that ROA affects bank efficiency positively. The profitable 
banks are more able to control all aspects of costs which leads to higher efficiency (Girardone 
et al., 2004). 
Bank competition is measured by the Lerner index. Following the competition-efficiency and 
competition-inefficiency hypotheses discussed in the literature review, there is no prior 
expectation of this variable. Further, banking sector development is measured by the ratio of 
banking sector assets to GDP (see Tan and Floros, 2012a; 2012b; 2012c). A more developed 
banking market indicates that the demand for banking services is large, due to the fact that it is 
quite difficult for new banks to enter the market; hence, the relative short supply and increase in 
demand lifts the prices for banking services. The resulting improvement in bank profitability 
induces bank managers to be less careful in controlling costs which leads to a decline in bank 
efficiency. Therefore, it is expected that this variable has a significant and negative impact on 
bank efficiency. Stock market development is measured by the ratio of stock market 
capitalization to GDP (see Tan and Floros, 2012a; 2012b; 2012c). It is expected to be 
significantly and positively related to bank efficiency. A more highly developed stock market 
provides more valuable information to the banks in terms of credit conditions of different 
companies, and hence, the resulting reduction in monitoring costs leads to an improvement in 
bank efficiency.  
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Inflation is expected to affect bank efficiency negatively due to the fact that under inflationary 
conditions, banks might feel less pressure to control their inputs, and therefore they become less 
efficient (Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 2010). Higher GDP growth stimulates investment; the 
resulting increase in the volumes of banking business in terms of traditional loan-deposit 
services and non-interest generating activities reduces bank costs and leads to an improvement 
in bank efficiency. Therefore, it is expected that GDP growth rate affects technical efficiency 
positively. Table 3 presents the variables used in the paper.  
<<Table 3---about here>> 
5 Data and Empirical results 
The banking data includes 100 Chinese commercial banks (5 SOCBs, 12 JSCBs and 83 CCBs) 
over the period 2003-2013. Due to the fact that not all the selected banks have available 
information for all years, an unbalanced panel dataset is chosen in order not to lose degrees of 
freedom. The bank-specific variables are selected from the Bankscope database. The banking 
sector development is collected from the CBRC annual reports, while both the stock market 
development and the macroeconomic data (inflation and annual GDP growth rate) are collected 
from the World Bank database. Table 4 shows the summary statistics of the independent 
variables used. The table shows that the differences in liquidity risk undertaken by Chinese 
commercial banks are smaller than the ones for credit risk and capital risk, while the higher 
levels of credit risk undertaken by Chinese commercial banks are attributed to the fact that 
during 2003-2006, there were large volumes of non-performing loans in SOCBs, especially in 
the Agricultural Bank of China. Further, the large difference in capital risk is attributed to the 
opening of one joint-stock commercial bank; namely, the China Bohai Bank in 2006 which had 
a total regulatory capital ratio of over 60%. The data indicates that Chinese banks have big 
differences in the degree of diversified activities engaged in, while the differences in 
profitability are smaller. The difference in bank size is attributed to the fact that SOCBs are 
bigger than JSCBs, while CCBs are the smallest. The competition indicator shows that Chinese 
banks have quite high competitive power, while the difference in the competitive power 
between banks is not large. The statistics show further that there is a stronger volatility with 
regard to the development of the stock market than of the banking sector and the 
macroeconomic environment. The stronger volatility of stock market development can be 
attributed mainly to the segregation reform initiated by the Chinese government in 2005 which 
led to a substantial amount of companies being listed on the stock exchange. By the end of 2007, 
there were 1550 listed companies on the Shanghai and Hong Kong Stock Exchanges, the value 
of which reached RMB 32.71 billion, accounting for 132.6% of GDP in that year.  
<<Table 4--about here>> 
 
5.1 Technical efficiency of state-owned, joint-stock and city commercial banks in China 
Table 5 shows the technical efficiency, pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency scores of 
Chinese SOCBs, JSCBs and CCBs derived from the non-parametric DEA CCR and BCC 
models. The results show that the SOCBs have the highest technical efficiency over the period 
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examined, followed by the CCBs. The JSCBs are found to be the least technically efficient. The 
highest technical efficiency of SOCBs can be attributed to the fact that all of them finished their 
initial public offerings over the period examined. The initial public offerings improve bank 
management and further precede improvements in bank efficiency, while the lowest technical 
efficiency of JSCBs can be explained by the fact that they mainly service the small and medium 
size enterprises over the country, easily outnumbering the large state-owned enterprises. The 
resulting greater competition leads to a decline in efficiency.  
Based on the decomposition of technical efficiency into pure technical efficiency and scale 
efficiency, the results suggest that SOCBs are most pure technically efficient, followed by 
JSCBs, while CCBs have the lowest pure technical efficiency. It is further noticed that scale 
efficiency is higher than pure technical efficiency which indicates that scale efficiency 
contributes more than pure technical efficiency to the overall technical efficiency of the Chinese 
banking sector. In other words, the inefficiency of Chinese commercial banks is attributed to 
pure technical inefficiency rather than scale inefficiency.  
<<Table 5---about here>> 
5.2 Competitive conditions in the Chinese banking industry 
Figure 1 shows the competitive conditions i n  t h e  Chinese banking industry over the 
period examined. The Lerner index suggests that over the period 2003-2013, SOCBs had the 
greatest market power. In other words, the competition among SOCBs in China is lower than 
for JSCBs and CCBs. This finding can be attributed mainly to the following factors: 1) the 
number of SOCBs is very low i.e. there are only five SOCBs (the low number of banks in 
this bank ownership type limits the competition between them); 2) government support to 
these banks significantly reduces the competitive conditions among the banks in this 
banking ownership type. Due to the “too big to fail” issue, the government provided 
different kinds of support to these banks, such as non-performing loan write-offs and 
capital injections. This support significantly reduced the banks’ incentives to improve 
efficiency and further decreased competition among them; 3) although there have been 
several rounds of banking reforms in China, each of the SOCBs has not limited their 
business to the specific economic sector, they established long-run relationships with 
specific large-scale enterprises. In other words, each of the SOCBs conducts their business 
with specific enterprises and the link between the enterprises and the specific SOCB reduces 
competition. 
   
Figure 1 shows that after 2005, CCBs had greater market power than JSCBs. In other words, 
there was lower competition among CCBs compared to JSCBs. The lower competition 
among this banking ownership type can be explained as follows: 1) most of the CCBs had 
not offered their initial public offerings yet, while the lower pressure of obtaining funds from 
the general public further reduced the competition between them. Furthermore, one of the 
characteristics of this banking ownership type is that most of the CCBs are still operating 
within the city where they were established (although the geographical limitation for 
operation has already been removed for CCBs with higher performance). In other words, 
each city commercial bank just serves the enterprises within their own city. This results in a 
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decline in bank competition. Finally, Figure 1 shows that the competition among JSCBs is 
the highest over the period 2005-2013. The finding is attributed mainly to the fact that 
most of the JSCBs have already been listed on the stock exchange and the incentive to 
obtain more funds from t he  general public induces an increase in bank competition. 
Secondly, JSCBs mainly serve small and medium size enterprises which account for over 
90% of total enterprises in China. In addition, the JSCBs have comprehensive branches all 
over the country; this leads to an increase in competition among the banks in this banking 
group. Thirdly, through several rounds of banking reforms in China, Chinese JSCBs have 
successfully attracted a number of foreign investors. The participation of foreign banks in 
Chinese banking operations not only brings more advanced technology and experience in 
risk management, b u t  it also induces bank managers to further improve bank 
performance which then leads to an increase in competition among the banks in this banking 
group. 
               
        <<Figure 1---about here>> 
 
5.3 Risk conditions in the Chinese banking sector over the period 2003-2013 
 
Figures 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d report the risk conditions of Chinese banks over the period 2003- 
2013, as measured by credit risk, liquidity risk, capital risk, and insolvency risk. Figure 2a 
shows that, over the period 2003-2008, the credit risk of SOCBs is substantially higher than 
the ones for JSCBs and CCBs, while the large volume of non- performing loans in SOCBs is 
attributable mainly to the fact that one of the banks (the Agricultural Bank of China) had 
non-performing loan ratios of more than 23% over the period 2003-2007. Although the 
figure shows that, after 2008, all the three different ownership types of Chinese commercial 
banks have little difference with regard to the levels of credit risk undertaken, the credit 
risk of CCBs is still higher than the one for JSCBs between 2005 and 2010. The lowest 
credit risk of JSCBs is attributed mainly to the fact that the participation of foreign investors 
in domestic JSCBs improves the techniques of risk management and further precedes a decline 
in credit risk. The significant lower amount of credit risk for all three different ownership 
types of Chinese banks after 2008 is attributed to the financial crisis, which induced the 
government and banking regulatory authorities to improve the process of credit checking, risk 
monitoring and risk management. 
 
<<Figure 2a---about here>> 
 
Liquidity risk, another risk indicator, is represented in Figure 2b, and shows that in general, 
the ratio of liquid assets to total assets of SOCBs is the lowest compared to the ones for 
JSCBs and CCBs. In other words, the SOCBs have the highest liquidity risk. This can be 
explained by the fact that SOCBs mainly make loans to large enterprises around the country, 
the loan demand for which is substantially higher than for medium and small enterprises, 
which are served by JSCBs and CCBs. On the other hand, the liquidity is the highest in 
CCBs over the period 2005-2008; this can be explained by the fact that the loans made by 
CCBs focus on small enterprises within the city, the amount of which is much smaller than 
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the one for SOCBs. It is clear that the JSCBs have the highest liquidity after 2010. This can 
be explained by the fact that the annual meeting of directors of JSCBs was held in 2010 
and the CBRC emphasized the importance of further increasing the liquidity of JSCBs. 
 
<<Figure 2b---about here>> 
 
The capital levels of SOCBs and JSCBs increased in 2010 compared to the previous year. 
This was due to two banks listing on the stock exchange - the Agricultural Bank of China 
(one of the SOCBs) and the China Everbright Bank (one of the JSCBs). Although the capital 
level of CCBs decreases in some of the years over the period examined, it increases for most 
of the years. This increase in the capital levels is attributed to the contribution from city level 
government. 
 
<<Figure 2c---about here>> 
 
This study looks at the insolvency risk of the Chinese banking industry on a year by year 
basis, which is reflected by the stability inefficiency shown in Figure 2d. There is a strong 
volatility regarding the risk conditions in the Chinese banking sector over the period 2003- 
2006, while during 2007-2013 the Chinese banking sector has lower risk volatility. The 
stronger volatility over the period 2003-2006 can be explained by the fact that there is a large 
amount of non-performing loans in the Chinese commercial banks, especially in SOCBs, 
and the capital level of SOCBs is quite low. Furthermore, the Chinese government initiated 
a number of measurements to deal with it, such as capital injection and non-performing 
loan write-off, while the financial crisis which occurred in 2007-2008 induced bank 
managers to be more careful in conducting business. The 2008 Olympic Games held in 
Beijing further promoted the economic growth of China. The resultant decline in the 
probability of default decreased the risk and the increase in the capital level of Chinese 
commercial banks further improved the stability of the Chinese banking sector. 
<<Figure 2d---about here>> 
 
5.4 The impacts of risk and competition on efficiency in the Chinese banking sector  
 
Table 6 reports the impacts of risk and competition on the technical efficiency of Chinese banks 
under a bootstrap truncated regression analysis. The findings suggest that lower liquidity risk 
and lower insolvency risk precede an improvement in both the technical efficiency and the pure 
technical efficiency of Chinese banks. With regard to other bank-specific determinants of 
efficiency, the findings suggest that bank diversification is significantly and positively related to 
technical, pure technical and scale efficiencies, i.e. Chinese banks with more diversified 
activities have higher efficiency scores. This result is in line with the finding of Sufian (2009) 
for a sample of banks in Malaysia. However, it is in direct contrast with the finding of Stiroh 
and Rumble (2006) for US finance companies. The result can be explained by the fact that 
Chinese banks engaging in more diversified activities have the ability to reduce their costs via 
economies of scope which further precedes an improvement in efficiency.  
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The Lerner index, as a measure of bank competition, has significant and positive signs for 
technical and pure technical efficiencies, suggesting that greater competition precedes a decline 
in the technical and pure technical efficiencies of Chinese banks. This is in line with the 
competition-inefficiency hypothesis. In the Chinese banking industry, greater competition 
induces bank managers to lower the credit requirement for making loans to different enterprises; 
the resulting increase in monitoring costs precedes a decline in efficiency. The findings suggest 
that banking sector development in China has significant and positive impacts on the technical 
and pure technical efficiencies of Chinese banks as reflected by the significant and positive 
signs of this variable. This result indicates that the technical and pure technical efficiencies of 
Chinese banks are greater in a more developed banking sector. A more highly developed 
banking sector reflects the fact that the demand for banking services is large. The increased 
volumes of traditional loan-deposit services and non-interest generating activities engaged in by 
Chinese banks reduce the costs of banks via economies of scale and economies of scope; hence, 
the cost reduction leads to improvements in technical and pure technical efficiencies. 
 
Stock market development is found to be significantly and negatively related to the technical 
and pure technical efficiencies of Chinese banks, indicating that Chinese banks have lower 
technical and pure technical efficiencies in a more developed stock market. This result can be 
explained by the fact that in a more highly developed stock market, firms obtain funds from the 
stock market rather than from banks. Therefore, the incentives for bank managers to increase 
the volumes of business engaged in increases competition. As discussed in the competition 
variable, the increase in competition precedes a decline in efficiency. 
In terms of the macroeconomic variables, the results suggest that in a high inflation 
environment, the technical efficiency and pure technical efficiency of Chinese banks is greater, 
as reflected by the significant and positive signs of this variable. This finding is in direct 
contrast with the results reported by Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras (2010) for several commercial 
banks from 87 countries. The Chinese government and the banking regulatory authorities use 
different measures to battle higher inflation, such as increasing the interest rate and increasing 
the bank reserve ratio. A higher interest rate on loans and a higher reserve ratio reduces the 
volumes of loans made by banks which reduces the cost of monitoring and managing risk. Thus, 
the efficiency of Chinese banks is improved. 
The results show that GDP growth rate is significantly and positively related to the technical 
and pure technical efficiencies of Chinese banks, indicating that Chinese banks have higher 
technical and pure technical efficiencies during periods of economic boom. During these 
periods, the demand for banking services becomes larger and the quality of borrowers improves 
significantly; the resulting reduction in the cost of monitoring risk and the reduction in cost 
from economies of scale and scope precede improvements in efficiency. Finally, it shows that 
compared to the SOCBs, JSCBs and CCBs have lower technical efficiency and lower pure 
technical efficiency.  
<<Table 6---about here>> 
6 Robustness check 
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This paper uses various ways to check the robustness of the result. First, we use the fractional 
logit regression proposed by Papka and Wooldridge (1996). The rationale for using this 
econometric technique is based on the argument of McDonald (2009) that DEA efficiency is the 
outcome of a fractional logit process rather than a truncated process. As well as using an 
alternative econometric technique, the current study also uses an alternative competition 
indicator; namely an efficiency-adjusted Lerner index to test the robustness of the results. 
Kotter et al. (2012) argue that the traditional price-cost margins derived from the Lerner index 
do not measure correctly the true extent of market power; they proposed another better 
measurement of competition namely an efficiency-adjusted Lerner index17. Tables 7 and 8 show 
the results of the robustness check. Both of these tables confirm the findings reported in Table 6 
as follows: 1) lower liquidity risk leads to improvements in the technical and pure technical 
efficiencies of Chinese banks; 2) higher bank diversification improves the technical, pure 
technical and scale efficiencies of Chinese banks; 3) higher banking sector competition in China 
reduces the technical and pure technical efficiencies of Chinese banks; 4) a more highly 
developed banking sector in China is helpful in increasing the technical and pure technical 
efficiencies of Chinese banks; 5) Chinese banks had lower technical and pure technical 
efficiencies when there was a more developed stock market; 6) higher inflation precedes an 
improvement in technical efficiency of Chinese banks; 7) during the periods of economic boom, 
Chinese banks have higher technical and pure technical efficiencies; 8) the results confirm that 
compared to the state-owned commercial banks, joint-stock commercial banks have lower 
technical and pure technical efficiencies. 
<<Table 7---about here>> 
<<Table 8---about here>> 
7 Summary and conclusions 
The banking sector is the most important component of the Chinese economy. The Chinese 
government and the banking regulatory authorities have attached great importance to bank 
performance and the healthy development of the banking sector. The 2007 financial crisis made 
the Chinese government and banking regulatory authorities focus on reducing the levels of risk 
undertaken by Chinese commercial banks. The empirical literature has documented that risk has 
a significant impact on bank efficiency and a number of pieces of research have investigated 
this issue in the European banking sector. The empirical research examining the impact of risk 
on efficiency in the Chinese banking sector is relatively scarce (see Ariff and Can, 2008; Tan 
and Floros, 2013 and Zhang et al., 2013). Several rounds of banking reforms in China have 
improved competitive conditions, which are designed to have a significant impact on the 
efficiency of Chinese commercial banks.  
                                                           
17 The efficiency-adjusted Lerner index used in this paper can be expressed as 
follows:
ii
iii
i
tc
qmctc
dexadjustedinefficiency
+
+−+
=
π
π
,  π represents bank profit (net income), tc 
represents total cost (non-interest expenses and interest expenses); mc stands for marginal cost, 
q stands for earning assets (loans and total securities),i represents specific bank.  
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This paper investigates the impacts of risk and competition on the efficiency of 100 Chinese 
banks over the period 2003-2013. The study is the first piece of research which 
comprehensively examines different types of bank risk, including credit risk, liquidity risk, 
capital risk, and insolvency risk. In addition, this paper is the first to use the Lerner index as a 
competition indicator to investigate the competition-efficiency and competition-inefficiency 
hypotheses in the Chinese banking sector. This study also controls for various bank-specific, 
industry-specific and macroeconomic variables which are supposed to have significant impacts 
on bank efficiency.  In order to check the robustness of the results, an alternative econometric 
technique (fractional logit regression) and an alternative competition indicator (efficiency-
adjusted Lerner index) are used.  
The findings show that technical and pure technical efficiencies of Chinese commercial banks 
are significantly and negatively affected by liquidity risk. Furthermore, the results show that in 
the Chinese banking industry, the competition-inefficiency hypothesis holds. It is reported that 
Chinese bank efficiency is significantly affected by bank diversification, banking sector 
development, stock market development, inflation and GDP growth rate, while the results show 
that compared to the state-owned commercial banks, joint-stock and city commercial banks 
have lower technical and pure technical efficiencies.  
Future research can extend the current study in the following ways: 1) liquid risk is measured 
by the ratio of liquid assets to total assets, while further study should take into account the 
maturity of assets and liabilities, and calculate the maturity gap to check the robustness of the 
results; 2) the capital risk should be estimated using the value at risk model to see whether our 
results hold; 3) the robustness of our results can also be checked by using an alternative 
competition measure such as the Boone indicator; 4) rather than using the non-parametric DEA 
analysis to evaluate the efficiency, the parametric SFA can be used, depending on the size of 
the sample. 
The results are helpful for the Chinese government and banking regulatory authorities to make 
relevant policies to improve the efficiency of Chinese banks, as follows: 1) relevant skills 
should be improved by bank managers in China to better allocate the inputs and outputs in 
banking operation; 2) certain regulation should be made to require the Chinese commercial 
banks to further increase the level of liquidity; 3) Chinese banks should be encouraged to 
engage in larger volumes of security business; 4) relevant policies should be made to encourage 
Chinese commercial banks to engage in more diversified activities; 5) joint-stock commercial 
banks and city commercial banks should further improve their management, as the resulting 
improvement in pure technical efficiency has a positive impact on the overall technical 
efficiency of these two ownership types. 
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Figure 1 Competitive conditions of Chinese banks over the period 2003-2013 (Lerner 
index) 
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Figure 2 Risk conditions in the Chinese banking sector: 2003-2013 
Figure 2a Credit risk in the Chinese banking industry: 2003-2013                                              Figure 2b Liquidity risk in the Chinese banking industry: 2003-2013                  
 
                                           
Figure 2c Capital risk in the Chinese banking industry: 2003-2013                                             Figure 2e Insolvency risk (stability inefficiency) in the Chinese banking     
                                                                                                                                                                               industry: 2003-2013                        
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Table 1 Total assets of SOCBs, JSCBs and CCBs and all banking institutions over the period 2003-2013 (RMB 100 million) 
 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
SOCBs 160512 179817 210050 242364 285000 325751 407998 468943 536336 600401 656005 
JSCBs 29599 36476 44655 54446 72742 88337 118181 149037 183794 235271 269361 
CCBs 14622 17056 20367 25938 33405 41320 56800 78526 99845 123469 151778 
Banking 
institutions 
276584 315990 374697 439500 531160 631515 795146 953053 1132873 1136224 1513547 
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Table 2 Summary statistics of inputs and outputs used to estimate the efficiency scores 
 
Variables Observations Mean S.D Min Max 
Inputs  
Total cost 
(interest 
expenses and 
non-interest 
expenses) 
777 3.35 0.97 -0.79 6.86 
Price of 
funds (the 
ratio of 
interest 
expenses 
over total 
deposits) 
777 1.27 0.18 0.74 1.96 
Price of 
capital (the 
ratio of non-
interest 
expenses 
over fixed 
assets) 
776 1.92 0.26 0.68 2.83 
Outputs  
Total loans 784 4.59 0.99 0.34 7.95 
Securities 782 4.21 1.04 -0.41 7.87 
Non-interest 
income 
767 2.34 1.1 -2.4 5.81 
Total 
deposits 
784 4.85 0.98 0.66 8.26 
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Table 3 Description of the variables used in the bootstrap truncated regression model 
 
Variables Description Hypothesized 
relationship with 
efficiency 
Data source 
Risk variables    
Credit risk The ratio of impaired 
loans to gross loans 
- Bankscope 
Liquidity risk The ratio of liquid 
assets to total assets 
+ Bankscope 
Capital risk Total regulatory 
capital ratio 
+ Bankscope 
Insolvency risk Stability inefficiency - Bankscope 
Other bank-specific 
variables 
   
Bank size Natural logarithm of 
total assets 
+ Bankscope 
Bank diversification Ratio of non-interest 
income to gross 
revenue 
+ Bankscope 
Bank profitability Return on assets + Bankscope 
Industry-specific 
variables 
   
Banking sector 
competition 
Efficiency-adjusted 
Lerner index 
? Bankscope 
Banking sector 
development 
Ratio of banking 
sector assets to GDP 
- China Banking 
Regulatory 
Commission 
Stock market 
development 
Capitalization of 
stock market  to GDP 
+ World Bank 
Macroeconomic 
environment 
   
Inflation Annual inflation rate - World Bank 
GDP growth rate Annual GDP growth 
rate 
+ World Bank 
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics of all variables considered in this study 
 
Variables Observations Mean S.D Min Max 
Credit risk 632 2.78 4.48 0 41.86 
Liquidity risk 777 0.27 0.11 0.02 0.67 
Capital risk  637 11.91 4.7 0.62 62.62 
Insolvency 
risk 
1100 0.33 0.21 0.025 0.789 
Bank 
profitability 
806 0.009 0.007 -0.04 0.106 
Bank size 843 4.9 0.992 0.71 8.51 
Bank 
diversification 
828 13.98 13.31 -12.94 79.4 
Banking 
sector 
development 
1100 2.22 0.24 1.98 2.66 
Stock market 
development 
1027 71.2 43.49 31.9 184.1 
Inflation 1227 2.86 1.92 -0.77 5.86 
GDP growth 
rate 
1199 10.19 1.87 7.7 14.2 
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Table 5 Mean values of technical efficiency, pure technical efficiency and scale 
efficiency for all Chinese commercial banks: 2003-2013 
 
 
Banks/efficiency scores Technical efficiency Pure technical 
efficiency 
Scale efficiency 
State-owned 
commercial banks 
0.97 0.975 0.995 
Joint-stock commercial 
banks 
0.913 0.928 0.977 
City commercial banks 0.915 0.926 0.974 
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Table 6 Results of the bootstrap truncated regression on the impacts of risk and 
competition on bank efficiency 
 Dependent 
variable=technical 
efficiency 
Dependent variable=pure 
technical efficiency 
Dependent 
variable=scale efficiency 
Independent 
variables 
Coefficient T-stat Coefficient T-stat Coefficient T-stat 
Risk variables  
Credit risk 0.001 1.31 0.0008 0.84 -0.0005 -0.55 
Liquidity risk 0.08** 2.04 0.06* 1.93 0.035 0.70 
Capital risk -0.0004 -0.37 -0.0006 -0.76 0.0008 0.44 
Insolvency risk -0.023* -1.73 -0.025* -1.90 -0.004 -0.20 
Other bank-
specific variables 
  
Bank size -0.004 -0.76 0.005 0.92 -0.009 -0.93 
Bank 
diversification 
0.001*** 5.16 0.001*** 5.86 0.002*** 3.99 
Bank profitability -0.27 -0.41 -0.27 -0.48 0.47 0.85 
Industry-specific 
variables 
 
Lerner index 0.61*** 6.85 0.56*** 7.47 0.14 1.44 
Banking sector 
development 
0.19*** 8.08 0.18*** 8.44 -0.02 -0.71 
Stock market 
development 
-0.0005*** -5.89 -0.0006*** -8.81 0.0001 1.08 
Macroeconomic 
variables  
 
Inflation  0.004*** 2.61 0.002* 1.73 0.002 0.94 
GDP growth rate 0.017*** 8.50 0.018*** 9.90 0.001 0.36 
Joint-stock banks -0.06*** -4.14 -0.04** -2.53 -0.08*** -3.05 
City banks -0.08*** -5.70 -0.055*** -3.32 -0.08*** -2.53 
Constant -0.18** -2.21 -0.15* -1.86 0.99*** 7.71 
No. of 
observations 
377 358 354 
Log likelihood 754.47 765.53 1155.53 
Wald chi square 642.01*** 392.18*** 30.93*** 
Notes:*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 Results of fractional logit regression on the impacts of risk and competition on 
bank efficiency 
 Dependent 
variable=technical 
efficiency 
Dependent variable=pure 
technical efficiency 
Dependent 
variable=scale efficiency 
Independent 
variables 
Coefficient T-stat Coefficient T-stat Coefficient T-stat 
Risk variables  
Credit risk 0.01 1.59 0.02* 1.92 -0.02 -1.43 
Liquidity risk 0.99** 2.26 1.13*** 2.73 0.45 0.71 
Capital risk -0.008 -0.87 -0.01 -1.03 -0.03 -0.84 
Insolvency risk -0.17 -1.16 -0.19 -1.14 0.11 0.28 
Other bank-
specific variables 
  
Bank size -0.13** -2.03 -0.09 -1.44 -0.08 -0.37 
Bank 
diversification 
0.01*** 5.42 0.01*** 4.39 0.05** 2.27 
Bank profitability -4.45 -0.93 -5.55 -1.10 -2.56 -0.32 
Industry-specific 
variables 
 
Lerner index 6.04*** 9.33 6.19*** 9.71 7.2** 2.43 
Banking sector 
development 
3.29*** 10.36 3.93*** 11.06 1.07* 1.80 
Stock market 
development 
-0.006*** -6.21 -0.007*** -6.99 -0.004 -0.97 
Macroeconomic 
variables  
 
Inflation  0.1*** 6.93 0.11*** 7.44 0.17** 2.45 
GDP growth rate 0.22*** 8.37 0.26*** 9.24 0.2* 1.76 
Dummy 1 (JSCBs) -0.97*** -4.78 -0.95*** -4.12 -0.84** -2.50 
Dummy 2 (CCBs) -1.29*** -5.86 -1.27*** -5.15 -0.83 -1.53 
Constant -11.11*** -11.07 -12.97*** -12.05 -5.76 -1.11 
No. of 
observations 
444 445 445 
Log likelihood -86.58 -77.88 -26.8 
Notes:*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8 Results of bootstrapped truncated regression on the impacts of risk and 
competition on bank efficiency (efficiency-adjusted Lerner index as competition 
indicator) 
 Dependent 
variable=technical 
efficiency 
Dependent variable=pure 
technical efficiency 
Dependent 
variable=scale efficiency 
Independent 
variables 
Coefficient T-stat Coefficient T-stat Coefficient T-stat 
Risk variables  
Credit risk 0.001 0.82 0.0002 0.17 -0.0001 -0.13 
Liquidity risk -0.02 -0.45 -0.04 -0.97 0.005 0.10 
Capital risk 0.0002 028 -0.0001 -0.17 0.001 0.74 
Insolvency risk -0.03 -1.55 -0.03** -2.23 -0.003 -0.11 
Other bank-
specific variables 
  
Bank size -0.005 -0.83 0.005 1.05 -0.012 -1.17 
Bank 
diversification 
0.001*** 4.77 0.001*** -3.68 0.003*** 4.44 
Bank profitability -1.58** -1.99 -1.63* -1.89 0.61 0.57 
Industry-specific 
variables 
 
Efficiency-
adjusted Lerner 
index 
0.3*** 6.46 0.3*** 4.55 0.06 0.95 
Banking sector 
development 
0.19*** 8.33 0.17*** 8.35 -0.02 -0.62 
Stock market 
development 
-0.001*** -7.11 -0.001*** -9.51 0.0001 0.69 
Macroeconomic 
variables  
 
Inflation  0.003** 2.54 0.002 1.43 0.001 0.68 
GDP growth rate 0.02*** 8.59 0.02*** 9.81 0.001 0.40 
Joint-stock banks -0.08*** -5.68 -0.06*** -4.13 -0.08** -2.19 
City banks -0.11*** -5.98 -0.08*** -4.74 -0.08** -2.18 
Constant 0.28*** 4.10 0.27*** 4.06 1.1*** 11.48 
No. of 
observations 
386 365 363 
Log likelihood 749.77 760.23 1183.52 
Wald test 346.15*** 363.87*** 35.53*** 
Notes:*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
